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NAIVE REALISM
IN PHILOSOPHY OF LITERATURE
Thomas W. Leddy
The journal Philosophy and Literature is one
of the leading locations for contemporary discus
sions of the relations between philosophy and lit
erature. Recently the journal came out with its
20th Anniversary Issue, a copy of which I re
ceived because I had written a book review for the
issue. For the fun of it I decided to read the issue
from front to back. I was struck by how many of
the articles were committed to some form of what
1
has traditionally been called naive realism.
Much is said positively about science and scien
tific method, whereas schools of thought that
have often criticized naive realism, for example
post-structuralism and Rortyan pragmatism,
come under frequent attack. This is not surpris
ing, given that the editorial, by Dennis Dutton
and Patrick Henry, focuses on Alan Sokal's ex
planation of his now famous hoax against the
well-known cultural studies journal Social Text.'
While reading the issue it occurred to me that
journals are units of cultural production, and that
they should be as open to discussion and critique
as anything else. Although it would be difficult to
read the entire production of a journal, a special
anniversary issue would surely represent the gen
eral point of view of the editors and the contribu
tors.
Someone might object to criticism of one
journal appearing in another, for example in Phi
losophy Today. It is my view that writing a cri
tique of this sort is not fundamentally different
from writing a review of an edited collection of
essays. It should also be stressed that I have no in
tention to denigrate the work of the editors of
Philosophy ofLiterature, which I consider to be a
fine publication. My only desire is to open up
new avenues of discussion for the issues raised in
that journal. •
My general claim then is that the anniversary
issue of Philosophy and Literature, taken as a
whole, is a defense of naive realism against the
various opponents of that position. (I shall call
this defense of naive realism "the new realism.")
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We certainly need some sort of corrective against
the recent excesses of postmodern literary theory
and philosophy. But pendulum swings have a
way of overcorrecting. Nothing is being said by
any of the authors found in this issue about the
limits or possible disadvantages of naive realism,
or of the metaphysical assumptions behind that
position.
Part of reason why these assumptions are not
addressed is that the awfulness of the opposition
seems so glaring. The new realists frequently and
gleefully point to the inscrutable jargon, incon
sistencies and bad arguments of their opponents.
(Editor, Dennis Dutton, runs a well-known an
nual Bad Writing Contest for the "ugliest, most
stylistically awful single sentence--or string of
no more than three sentences--found in a pub
lished scholarly book or article." 5 Some of the
winners are simply stunning.) This may lead
them to believe that a combination of clarity,
logic and scientific method will save literary
studies and philosophy from the barbarians.
These concerns are certainly legitimate, and
nothing I will say here is intended to justify
poststructuralist outrages. I would simply like us
to engage in a bit of hopefully jargon-free and
clear-headed questioning about new realism it
self.
First, a comment about the term "realism."
Most people would consider themselves realists
in some sense. I certainly do. Those who, like
myself, are opposed to, or at least critical of the
version of realism found in these pages tend tore
fer to it as "naive realism." The true realism, on
our account, is not naive. Naive realism is not
truly realist, not realistic enough. It was a sad
mistake for critics of naive realism to have called
themselves anti-realists, since this allowed the
term "realism" to remain in the hands of their op
ponents.
The most fundamental assumption of naive
realism is existence, stability, independence and
ideal determinability of facts. The naive realist
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would not go so far as to say, with Wittgenstein,
that the world is all that is the case. But the naive
realist believes that there is, indeed, all that is the
case. For naive realism, the truth is the truth, the
facts are the facts. Naive realists believe that the
world is totally independent of our interpreta
tions of it. They believe that, as confused as our
representations may be, the world itself is clear;
and that the distinctions between things, espe
cially things referred to by accurately developed
abstract ideas, are sharply defined. Thus, knowl
edge for the naive realist is simply a matter ofbe
coming clear about these real-world distinctions.
Here's an example of a naive realist assump
tion. Wendell V. Harris asks "Which of us could
give a complete and accurate report of everything
we did yesterday?" 6 Harris assumes in the very
asking of this question that there is such a thing as
everything we did yesterday, and that there could,
ideally, be a complete and accurate report of it,
even though none of us mortals could actually
produce it. Since Harris admits that no such ac
count has ever been given then what evidence
7
does he have for its existence?
There is no denying that the naive realist
model of the world works very well in most con
texts. It is self-consistent, elegant, explains
much, and seems to make those who believe in it
comfortable and productive. Naive realists are
sensible people, and cheerful too. They may even
make better social activists or better scientists, as
William Sokal suggests in his article. Sokal de
scribes himself as a "stodgy old scientist who be
lieves, naively, that there exists an external world,
and there exist objective truths about that world,
and that my job is to discover some of them."'
This is a pretty good summary of the position of
the new realist.
This attitude is fine for natural scientists.
Sokal, a physicist, rightly satirizes those who
wish to play literary games with quantum me
chanics. But naive realists are, I believe, deeply
wrong when they assume that naive realism tells
the whole story about reality; that there is an ulti
mately clear distinction between external and in
ternal reality; that objective truths are simply and
purely objective; and that discovery is simply and
purely discovery.
The epistemological and metaphysical point I
wish to make is a simple one. Naive realists be
lieve that the world is fundamentally clear and
distinct. But there is no good reason to believe

that the world is so, and much reason to believe
that it is not.
In doing some research on Indian Aesthetics I
recently ran across an old article by Archie J.
9
Bahm which will help me to make my point.
Bahm notes that a basic distinction between In
dian and Western philosophy is that the Indian
philosopher believes that ultimate reality is fun
damentally indistinct, whereas the Westerner be
lieves that it is fundamentally distinct. ("Advaita
Vedanta calls ultimate reality 'Nirguna Brah
man,' being without qualities. Samkyhya-Yoga
philosophers call the ultimate state of purusha
(soul) kaivalya, perfect liberation from all limita
tions. Theravada and Sunyavada Buddhists call it
'Nibbana' (Nirvana, no wind) .... All [of these
schools] alike, despite their other metaphysical
disagreements, depict ultimacy as pure indis
tinctness.")10 Indian philosophy then holds that
reality is beyond reason "for reason begins to act
by making distinctions, and rationality exists
only where there are ratios, relationships, differ
ences, and distinctness." I am not using this quote
to advocate any essentialist distinctions between
India and the West. My point is simply that at
least some people, for example most of the writ
ers for the 20th anniversary issue of Philosophy
and Literature, assume the view that Bahm de
scribes as Western, i.e. that the world is funda
mentally distinct. Nor am I saying that this alter
native position is correct. There is no more reason
to think that the world is ultimately indistinct
than to think that it is ultimately distinct. The
point is that there is a range of reasonable possi
bility here----one not considered by naive realists.
A historical note: the view that the world is
distinct was dominant in analytic philosophy of
the first half of the century: was contained in the
very notion of "analysis." The new realists sim
ply apply the idea of analysis beyond language to
reality itself. The analytic philosophers were a bit
more modest, but then the success of modern sci
ence was a bit more modest then too. Each dis
covery of a new human genetic propensity or of a
new planet beyond the solar system seems to sup
port the view that the world itself is clear and dis
tinct. And yet, we know all too well that attempts
to find clear and distinct categories in human
matters often lead to distortion, as can be seen for
example in the troubles entailed by
mathematization of economics. 11

PHILOSOPHY OF LITERATURE
101

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Is there any reason to believe that the human
world (the world as we experience it with refer
ence to human values and concerns) is ultimately
clear and distinct? Take for example the problem
of intentions, so central to the theory of interpre
tation. Do we have any reason to believe that the
intentions of authors are clearly and distinctly
there to be discovered? Do we have any reason to
believe that they are there in the same way that
pennies in a jar are there? Maybe they are there,
but not in a way anything like the way that pen
nies in ajar are there. I will have something to say
about this later on.
The point I want to make here is metaphysical:
that there is reason to believe that an aspect of re
ality itself is ultimately indistinct. This is similar
to a point I have made elsewhere, that there is a
fundamentally metaphorical aspect of reality. 1'
The current crop of naive realists are not, to their
credit, opposed to metaphors. However they only
find metaphors valuable as devices that can help
reveal a reality that is fundamentally not meta
phorical. (This comes out explicitly, for instance,
13
in Susan Haack's article). This is why naive re
alists generally reject the notion of metaphorical
truth, or believe that metaphorical truths are true
only to the extent that they may be translated into
something that is literally true.
This all leads us back to the old debate be
tween philosophy and literature, famously re
ferred to by Plato. There is an intuition, contained
within literature itself, that there is a fundamen
tally metaphorical aspect to reality, or maybe
even that reality itself is ultimately metaphorical,
contradictory, or paradoxical. I am not saying
that literary theorists believe this: many of them
are on the side of the philosophical mainstream
on this issue. I do think that most creative writers
and some philosophers (against the example of
Plato) would agree that at least some aspect of re
ality is itself metaphorical.
To argue this is not to give up the concept of
truth, any more than it is to give up realism. A
look at Susan Haack's article will help to articu
late this point. Haack thinks that philosophy
should be scientific in Peirce's sense: that philos
ophers should crave to know how things really
are, seek the truth, and do so through a scientific
method which, in Peirce's view, requires close at
tention to the character of everyday experience,
not laboratory experimentation. Philosophy, on
this view, explores the "·universe of mind" just as

astronomers explore the stars. Haack, in support
ing Peirce, seeks to navigate between the Scylla
of displacement of philosophy by the natural sci
ences, and the Charybdis of its replacement by
the literary. Nothing is wrong with this so far.
However, Haack's call for a return to Peirce is
for a return to naive realism. Peirce's idea that
some items in philosophy will be "finally settled"
is a mark of this position. Peirce accepts the false
dichotomy that either philosophical questions
will be finally settled, or philosophy is a mere ex
ercise of cleverness. Haack joins Peirce in attack
ing philosophy done in a literary spirit. She
thinks such philosophy is a version of"fake rea
soning," which occurs when the reasoner is indif
ferent to the truth value of the proposition pro
pounded. Yet conviction that philosophical
questions will never be settled, and partaking in
literary spirit, does not necessarily mean a lack of
commitment to truth.
The reduction of truth to the truth value of
propositions is another sign of naive realism. It
assumes that propositions, properly dated, are
eternally and unchangingly true or false. Naive
realism is strangely like Platonism in this respect.
Its eternal Forms are dated propositions. How
could such a view be supported empirically? In
any case, there are other theories of truth not
committed to naive realism, for instance the prag
matism of James and Dewey, or Heidegger's dy
namic notion of truth as unconcealment ofBeing.
Haack sharply contrasts the aesthetic and the
true. She argues that the highest priorities of
philosophical writing should be "not elegance,
euphony, allusion, suggestiveness, but clarity,
precision, explicitness, directness." 14 But what if
accepting these as the highest priorities would be
inconsistent with the search for truth, for exam
ple when doing so distorts the unclear, imprecise,
and indirect nature of the subject under study?
Why assume that the qualities desirable in philo
sophical and scientific writing are the same, and
that philosophy and science stand together in op
position to literature on this?
I am not questioning the value of clarity and
precision as such, but the assumption that all of
reality is amenable to this approach, and that sug
gestiveness, for example, could never be the best
way to reveal reality or truth. Peirce and Haack
almost recognize this themselves when they
stress the importance of metaphor for philosophy
and science, but they do not take the next impor-
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tant step of recognizing a metaphorical aspect of
reality itself.
One can agree with Haack's general point that
priorities of philosophical writing are different
from literary priorities. The problem is that
Haack fails to see that poetry may sometimes just
get at truth better than philosophy. Haack con
cedes that works ofliterature may express philo
sophical insights. But that is not enough. She still
assumes that literature cannot express philosoph
ical ideas as well as philosophy, since philosophy
is explicit, direct and univocal, and literature is
not. This ignores the possibility that literature can
occasionally get at truth better than philosophy
precisely because, or precisely when, it is not ex
plicit, direct and univocal (and that philosophy it
self can sometimes do better when it is not so ex
plicit, direct, and literal-minded). It is doubtful
for instance whether a philosopher has ever said
anything about the nature of tragedy or love
which has not been said better in literature. It
seems these days that most of the interesting
things being said by philosophers about such
things are being said through philosophical inter
pretation ofliterature, as in Nussbaum's article in
15
this issue.
None of this, however, need lead us to agree
with a comment of Richard Rorty's mentioned by
Haack that to call a statement true is just to give it
a rhetorical pat on the back, or simply to say that
it is a belief with which we are able to agree. One
need not side with Rorty in holding that philoso
phy or science are merely types ofliterature in or
16
der to oppose Haack. The truth about truth is to
be found, I believe, someplace between Haack
and Rorty. Philosophy is not reducible to rhetoric
and literature, but philosophy must come to rec
ognize that truth, rhetoric, and narrative are ines
capably bound together.
There is a disturbing tendency in many of the
articles in this issue to understand the field of de
bate as simply consisting of two extremes. Sokal
for instance poses his own good objectivism
against bad subjectivism. He heads off any possi
bility of finding a position between the view that
non-context-dependent beliefs exist and can be
true, and the view that beliefs are only socially
accepted as true ("culturalism"). He insists that
people who want to make social change must ac
cept the first of these, or else throw out the idea
that the Nazi gas chambers were evil, as well as
the truth of quantum mechanics. Sokal thinks that

not accepting the first position is inevitably to ac
cept the second. He doesn't consider that it might
just be very useful in certain contexts to believe
that non-context-dependent beliefs exist even
though nothing is ever totally independent of
context, and that this view can be consistent with
rejecting culturalism.
This black-or-white attitude can be found in a
willingness to accuse others of self
contradiction. Wendell Harris, for instance, at
tacks post-structuralists for contradicting them
selves about the existence of such a thing as "the
author's intentions." I am not opposed to attack
ing people for self-contradiction. But are the
self-contradictions really there? Are they not
usually, and to a large degree, constructions of
the reading; for example, in this case, of Harris's
reading of post -structuralists?
Let us consider for a moment the structure of
accusations of self-contradiction. It is seldom no
ticed that to find actual instances of sentences of
the form "p and •p" is rare. One usually has to in
terpret what is said as "p and •p." And since peo
ple do not generally intend to contradict them
selves, one has to interpret what is said (or
written) as "p and --,p" against their implied or
even stated intentions! Thus a possible reply to
Harris is that the poststructuralist's apparent
self-contradictions are in fact Harris's own
readerly constructions.
But I think this is only partly right. It makes
more sense to say that self-contradictions are re
ally there, and they are (in part) constructions.
That is, they are really there potentially, and actu
alized in construction.
The same point goes with intentions. Contra
Harris, post-structuralists need not contradict
themselves when they look at the author's in
tended meaning, since to accept the existence of
intended meaning is not necessarily to accept the
naive realist view of intentions as concrete histor
ically unchanging objects. One can be a realist
about intentions without being a naive realist
about intentions; that is, without accepting that
there are eternal unchanging facts about inten
tions, or that they exist totally independent of our
interpretations of them.
Paisley Livingston is also a naive realist about
intentions although he qualifies this somewhat,
drawing from Jerrold Levinson's discussion of
17
the concept of oeuvre. Levinson rejects the radi
cal historicist idea that a work's artistic content
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can change. For both Levinson and Livingston
Moby Dick did not acquire any new artistic con
tent because of Joyce even though our knowl
edge of Joyce may help us to discover new as
pects of Melville.
That seems fine on the surface, and probably
works for everyday practice. But it assumes that
aspects of Melville's writing are in the writing
fully actualized, fully distinguished from each
other, prior to our interpretation of them. The as
sumption is based on nothing. At best, it is a use
ful myth. Any aspect that is found is found after
or through our interpretation of the work. Since
naive realists think that such qualities are clearly
and distinctly there, like pennies in a jar, they in
terpret the radical historicist claim as holding that
Joyce's work adds new qualities to Moby Dick.
That's a wrong interpretation of radical
historicism since it assumes that Moby Dick had a
determinate set of qualities prior to any interpre
tation. Levinson and Livingston are attacking a
straw man.
Aspects are not like pennies in a jar: they
emerge through interaction between the readers
and the text, and if the reader is influenced by
Joyce then the aspect that emerges is one that
could not have emerged earlier. It is a false di
chotomy to say either we discover aspects or we
just add them to the work: the discovered aspects
are also constructed. It might be replied that this
is a paradox: "how can something be both discov
ered and constructed at the same time?" Yet the
paradox is unresolvable only if one believes that
reality is ultimately clear and distinct. It is only
unresolvable if the distinction between discovery
and construction is rigid .
Livingston and Levinson do allow for moder
ate retroactivism (the view that meaning of a text
changes after completion of the text) as long as
we stay within the author's oeuvre. Yet why
should the author be the only privileged party?
Why couldn't we speak just as well of the oeuvre
of the school of writing, or even of the nation?
Why can't we speak of collective retroactive
intentionality? As soon as this is allowed naive
realism begins to dissolve.
Just as some authors make naive realist as
sumptions about author's intentions, others make
such assumptions about the reader's response.
For example, Roger Seamon looks for an expla
nation of poetry's power in rapid unconscious in
ferences." He believes that the poet presents the

reader with contrasted meanings that defeat nor
mal expectations, and that the reader is then
forced to bridge gaps in order to make sense of
the words. Seamon understands reading litera
ture along the lines of getting the point (')fa joke: a
gap is opened up by the author, which the reader
fills unconsciously with a series of inferences. He
calls the process "guided rapid unconscious re
configuration." The process is guided in the
sense that the artist designs the experience, and
unconscious because we are not aware of the
steps involved. Seamon also stresses that this
process is pleasurable.
Seamon has captured an important aspect of
our pleasurable experience of poetry. But is it
complete? Does this entirely explain the source
of our pleasure? Contrast Seamon's theory with
19
the Indian theory of poetry called rasa theory.
Rasa theory, like Seamon's, emphasizes the plea
sure gained from literary works. However, rasa
theory places its entire emphasis on the transfor
mation of emotions, rather than on cognitive in
ference. Rasa originally meant the flavor one
gets from tasting the juice of a fruit. It also refers
to the essence of a thing and to spiritual delight.
In aesthetics it refers to a kind of objectified plea
sure. The poet produces a work charged with a
dominant emotion. This, accompanied by sub
sidiary emotions, produces a certain overall taste
or flavor in the reader/viewer (rasa theory was
originally developed for drama, but was then ex
tended to all ofliterature ). The dominant emotion
is objectified and enjoyed as an ideal content. Ev
eryday feelings are purified, somewhat like ca
tharsis in Greek tragedy. Rasa is achieved in the
viewer because the dominant emotion is freed
from the unpleasant effects which would attend
such an emotion in everyday life. The feelings of
everyday life are recollected and lived through
again, but at another level. They become general
ized, and do not belong to anyone. This process
leads, in its most profound form, to a state of ec
stasy.
There seems to be some truth in rasa theory
not only for Indian poetry but for poetry in gen
eral. The theory shares some qualities with West
em expression theories of art, although it avoids
the disadvantages of crude versions of expression
theory.'" It is, in my view, somewhat more plausi
ble than Seamon's theory in that it explains why
literature seems to give us a different kind of
value than jokes. The truth probably lies in a
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combination of the two theories: capturing both
the cognitive and the emotional sides of our plea21
sure.
Rasa theory does not depend on the belief that
ultimate reality is determinant, but rather on the
belief that it is indeterminate. Seamon, by con
trast, understands aesthetic experience somewhat
mechanically in terms of a series of inferential
steps. Since naive realism requires that reality be
ultimately distinct, these steps must be distinct.
Seamon knows that we do not actually experi
ence these steps, and so he posits them as uncon
scious.12 There is no denying that conscious infer
ences play an important part in the pleasures of
reading poetry, but this does not mean that uncon
scious processes are equally inferential, or un
derstandable in terms of clear and distinct steps.
Unconscious reconfiguration may have a much
more organic and emotional quality. If poetic
pleasure was just a matter of pleasure taken in
rapid unconscious puzzle-solving, then there
would be no room for savoring the transforma
tion of mood that rasa theory describes.
Colin Martindale's article exemplifies an ex
treme version of naive realism, one that bears a
striking resemblance to old-time positivism." He
holds that humanistic inquiry is not as effective as
scientific inquiry, that the only meaningful ques
tions are empirical questions, that only science
can answer these questions, and that literary the
orists know nothing of how to test their hypothe
ses. He thinks he can show empirically, contra
deconstructionists and others, that people pretty
much agree in their interpretations ofliterature.
Yet the logic of Martindale's argument is
questionable. He admits that every published in
terpretation of Hamlet differs from every other.
This should indicate that disagreement of inter
pretation is quite widespread. However
Martindale responds with the totally ad hoc hy
pothesis that such differences are due only to the
academic pressure for novelty. No empirical evi
dence is given for this claim, or for the fact that
people in informal literature discussion groups
often have differing interpretations despite the
lack of pressure to publish something novel.
More problematic is his method for testing
agreement. Martindale simply assumes that
agreement in responses to ratings on 7-point
scales is agreement in interpretation. Normally
we think of an interpretation of a literary work as
a substantial written account. For example, an es-

say on Hamlet might provide an interpretation of
that play. But, as Martindale notes, there is no
easy way to quantify such responses. This is why
he uses 7-point scales. Martindale recognizes
that some people will have problems with data
derived simply from subject responses to rat
ing-scaled questions, and so he has an additional
experiment in which his student subjects are
asked to write about a poem. They are given five
minutes to read the poem and fifteen minutes to
write about it. Five and fifteen minutes! To call
such products "interpretations" is generous at
best, as any professor who has read similar ef
forts can attest.
One may grant that Martindale has given
some reason to believe that for some very
low-level types of interpretation there is more
agreement than one might expect. He seems right
to criticize anyone who says there is equal dis
agreement at all levels of interpretation. But none
of this supports his claim that disagreements
among academics, who have spent considerably
more than 15 minutes on the works they interpret,
is due simply to the pressure for novelty. His con
clusion that "the point of enterprises such as
deconstructionism is ... rather unclear" is there
fore sadly unsupported. Martindale's methodol
ogy is based on the notion that the world is ulti
mately distinct (for example that "x's
interpretation ofy" is quantifiable in terms of dis
tinct properties correspondent to answers to
questions with seven-point scales) which, as I
have noted, is characteristic of naive realism. 24
For the sake of completeness I will mention
the other articles in the issue. Some of these do
not make naive realist assumptions but have a
similar theoretical slant to articles already dis
cussed. Eva T. H. Brann insists that teachers
should make students read what is good (what is
good is good!) and that the author is the last court
of appeal for interpretations. (This, again, treats
both value and interpretation in naive realist
terms.)'' Francis Sparshott rips into Edward
Said's politically inspired interpretive method,
showing that a close reading of Austen's
Mansfield Park and Kipling's Kim does not show
everything explainable in terms of Western impe
rialism.26 (I have no problem with Sparshott's
thesis, unless he is trying to make the more gen
eral point that politically inspired interpretation
is always wrong-headed.) Ihab Hassan also in
veighs against politically motivated criticism,
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holding that the current obsession with power in
the university skews our values." Finally, Eric
Miller opposes the poststructuralist idea that all
28
literature is self-referential.
Of course not all of the articles fit into the new
realist mode, for example Michael Wood's article
29
on Kafka and Martha Nussbaum's on Bronte. I
have not attempted to incorporate the book re
views into this analysis.
Conclusion
My aim in this essay has been to show that na
ive realism has its limits. My point is somewhat
like Kant's. The stuff that goes on beyond the cat
egories of the understanding is not understand
able by science but is. still important to us. The
aesthetic ideas, which Kant saw as essential to

the fine arts and in particular to poetry, give us a
strange sort of access to the supersensible realm.
Why? On my view, it is because this realm (mis
named and misplaced by Kant because it is not
really beyond sense, only beyond that aspect of
the world understandable in terms of clear and
distinct ideas) has a metaphorical structure simi
lar to that of aesthetic ideas themselves. Kant
would have recognized that a scientific or sci
ence-like conception of philosophy, advocated
by Haack and others in this issue of Philosophy
and Literature, is no less problematic than
Rorty's reduction of philosophy to mere conver
sation. My suggestion is that we need a bit of this
Kantian skepticism applied today to naive real
tsm.
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